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Abstract
The Internet routing protocol BGP expresses topological
reachability and policy-based decisions simultaneously in
path vectors. A complete view on the Internet backbone
routing is given by the collection of all valid routes,
which is infeasible to obtain due to information hiding
of BGP, the lack of omnipresent collection points, and
data complexity. Commonly, graph-based data models
are used to represent the Internet topology from a given
set of BGP routing tables but fall short of explaining
policy contexts. As a consequence, routing anomalies
such as route leaks and interception attacks cannot be
explained with graphs.
In this paper, we use formal languages to represent
the global routing system in a rigorous model. Our
CAIR framework translates BGP announcements into
a finite route language that allows for the incremental
construction of minimal route automata. CAIR preserves
route diversity, is highly efficient, and well-suited to
monitor BGP path changes in real-time. We formally
derive implementable search patterns for route leaks and
interception attacks. In contrast to the state-of-the-art,
we can detect these incidents. In practical experiments,
we analyze public BGP data over the last seven years.
1. INTRODUCTION
Measuring, modeling, and analyzing the routing be-
tween Autonomous Systems (ASes) have gained increas-
ing importance over the last decade [17,44,58], as the
Internet infrastructure has become business critical and
investigations of cyber security incidents intensified. To-
day the question of route integrity is prevalent in day-to-
day operations and a clear understanding of how data
should flow is urgently desired to quickly detect anoma-
lies. However, modeling Internet routing is still a major
challenge due to the complex decision making in the
Internet backbone. This work contributes a rigorous
approach to route modeling and analysis.
The Internet inter-domain routing system selects those
paths from the topologically possible paths that are
economically feasible and comply to individual policies.
Path vectors in BGP represent the outcome of this hybrid
decision process without revealing its underlying rules
explicitly. As such, BGP effectively hides most of its
operational semantics from observers and successfully
withstands the quest for a simple explanatory model [50].
The collection of all locally valid paths is essentially
what we can learn at any given observation point. These
paths are represented by our Constructible Automata for
Internet Routes (CAIR). CAIR offers two key advantages
over existing solutions:
a) By preserving policy-related information in its rout-
ing model, CAIR can reliably detect interception
attacks or route leaks as they violate policies.
b) CAIR is an efficient yet complete representation of
the observable inter-domain routing, which opens
up the field for new analyses—even in real-time.
Inter-provider connections are traditionally modeled
as a graph [44]. BGP peerings that show up in AS
paths are considered valid links between nodes (ASes).
Network graphs adequately represent connectivity in
terms of router links or AS peerings. For the analysis of
policy-influenced routing, though, such graphs tend to
oversimplify the real situation. Realistic routing paths
are selected on a per-prefix basis and often influenced
by local routing policies. In particular, network graphs
falsely imply transitivity over individual links and thus
introduce additional, potentially nonexistent (sub)paths.
Therefore, graph models cannot diagnose policy viola-
tions such as route leaking or complex anomalies such
as interception attacks.
In this paper, we solve the fundamental transitivity
problem in graphs (§ 2) for Internet routes. We remain
with the concept of (context-dependent) path vectors
and introduce a finite route language (§ 3) to model BGP
data. Starting from an alphabet of AS numbers and
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prefixes, we formally construct a complete description
of the observable routing system. With corresponding
route automata (§ 4), we show how to put this con-
cept into practical use. Using incrementally minimized
finite-state automata (§ 6), we arrive at a most efficient
representation of the path vector space, which outper-
forms network graphs. Route automata are policy-aware:
They represent the full characteristics of the observable
routing policies and, at the same time, reduce complex-
ity to real-time compliant processing. With CAIR, we
can further derive formal detection patterns for route
anomalies and apply these to real BGP data.
In our analysis of real-world incidents (§ 5), we focus
on two intricate anomalies. First, we search for intercep-
tion attacks, in which an adversary falsely attracts traffic
while maintaining a backhaul path to its victim to re-
lay eavesdropped packets. Second, we study (ab)normal
routing changes and gain insight into customer ASes that
erroneously advertise transit in a so-called route leak.
We validate our approach with well-known incidents and
identify 22 so far unknown cases of interception.
2. BACKGROUND AND INTUITION
We approach CAIR by describing a gap we currently
face in network modeling and analysis in connection with
common graph models. We then illustrate with some
background why a model based on formal languages
and automata can actually close this gap. For detailed
background on formal languages we refer to [31].
2.1 Motivating Example: Interception Attacks
Interception attacks are characterized by a subtle in-
jection of illegitimate prefix routes to redirect traffic
destined for a victim to the attacker. To search for
such events we need patterns and data models. A cru-
cial factor is to sustain global connectivity by relaying
all communication back to the victim. Implementing
such an attack in the Internet is feasible and has been
demonstrated in practice [12, 30, 46]. A malicious AS
needs to be connected to the Internet via at least two
upstream ISPs. The first ISP is used to attract traffic by
advertising the victim’s address space or a part thereof,
also called a hijacking attack. The second ISP serves to
preserve a stable backhaul path from the attacker to the
victim. To implement the backhaul path, the attacker
includes all ASes between himself and his victim in the
malicious BGP announcement. As a consequence, all
of these ASes discard the announcement due to loop
prevention, and a stable link from the attacker to the
victim’s AS remains intact. Figure 1 illustrates the
corresponding change in traffic forwarding.
Our key observation to derive a search pattern for
interception attacks is that an arbitrary ISP T normally
redistributes all routes of a distant AS V along the same
ways [2, 22] (Figure 1a). From a BGP policy point of
VUTS
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Figure 1: Attacker A intercepts subprefix P/24.
view, however, the attack induces a specific policy for the
redirected prefix. In our example, S forwards traffic to V
via the malicious AS A only for the prefix under attack,
but reaches all other prefixes of the victim directly via T
(Figure 1b). It is worth mentioning that the attacker can
easily hide his own identity by not adding his AS number
to the AS_PATH attribute of forged BGP messages, as it
is common practice with route servers [34], for instance.
To diagnose the difference, data models are needed to
express route diversity. Unfortunately, common graph
models lack this capability.
2.2 The Need for CAIR
Consider a routing table extract that includes routes
to three IP prefixes P1−3 originated by the same AS
AS3 as shown in Figure 2a. Obviously, a complete list
of all paths preserves the observable routing properties
but is inefficient to memorize and difficult to analyze.
A common way to represent such network topologies
reduces data to a graph G = (N,L) that is a set of nodes
N and links L describing connectivity between ASes.
For the analysis of policy-based routing, though, such
graphs tend to oversimplify real BGP operations. In
our example, transit paths to AS3 differ for individual
prefixes. Such prefix-based policies [2] are not reflected
in a graph model (compare to Figure 2b). Rather, the
model implies transitivity, which presumes reachability
that has not been observed. It is a modeling artifact.
Incorrect Transitivity Assumption in Graphs:
AS1 → AS2 , AS2 → AS3 ⇒ AS1 → AS3
Note that in our example, transitivity breaks for the
prefix P3, i.e. no route AS1 → AS2 → AS3 → P3 has
been observed. CAIR offers a natural solution to this
problem. It allows for an accurate representation of
observed routing paths and is a highly efficient approach
at the same time.
2.3 Why Using Finite Automata
A finite language consists of characters and rules to
construct words, which can be represented by a deter-
ministic finite-state automaton (DFA). In this paper, we
understand a given set of network paths as such a finite
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Figure 2: Representations of (re)distributed routes for prefixes P1−3 by autonomous systems AS1−4.
language. AS paths towards prefixes represent words of
this language. Our CAIR framework serves to construct
and minimize corresponding automata providing the
following unique features:
Accuracy All initially observed BGP paths are stored
in an automaton without introducing further unob-
served information. Consequently, CAIR accurately
reflects the observable routing system.
Expressiveness The states of a minimal DFA represent
equivalence classes such that two equivalent states
exhibit the same (routing) behaviour. CAIR exploits
this unique fact to reveal intrinsic routing properties,
such as the importance of an AS or the location of a
hidden attacker.
Feasability Well-understood algorithms exist to con-
struct a DFA. Processing of paths equals traversing
the automaton. As a consequence, CAIR supports
random access of data. It can be deployed both in
real-time to continuously monitor BGP as well as in
retrospective on archived data sets.
Efficiency Any DFA can be minimized without sacri-
ficing accuracy. The resulting minimal automaton is
unique. This is a highly efficient way to represent a
finite language in general [31], and consequently a set
of network paths we model with CAIR.
Despite this powerful feature set, concepts of formal
languages have not been applied, yet, in the context of
Internet routes. It is worth mentioning that other, less
popular data structures could correctly model network
paths, e.g. tries [4]. We will see later, however, that
CAIR naturally outperforms such data structures in
terms of expressiveness and efficiency.
2.4 CAIR in a Nutshell
CAIR derives a finite route language and constructs
a route automaton based on BGP data such that each
transition (edge) is labeled with either an AS number
or an IP prefix. CAIR thereby reduces the amount of
states by on-the-fly minimization. Traversing edges until
the final, accepting state of the automaton results into a
complete AS path as included in the initial BGP data set.
Having the automaton in place, we search for specific
properties. Since a DFA exists for any finite language
(and vice versa), route automata accurately model the
underlying input data and can thus be used to precisely
describe its intrinsic routing characteristics.
Toy Model. For our example in Figure 2a, correspond-
ing DFA and minimal DFA (MDFA) are shown in Fig-
ure 2c and Figure 2d respectively. In our CAIR frame-
work, we utilize the latter one for route analysis. An
important aspect of minimization is that we can observe
route diversity based on nonminimizable states. In the
minimal automaton, we obtain a sequence of indepen-
dent states (q1, q2, q3) and (q4, q5, q6) that represents the
nonuniform redistribution of prefixes {P1, P2} and {P3}
(compare Figure 2c and Figure 2d).
It is worth noting that CAIR does not intend to im-
prove on the incompleteness of measured BGP data.
Instead, we present a novel data model with maximum
expressiveness that allows for an accurate representation
of observed routing paths.
3. FINITE ROUTE LANGUAGES
A formal language is a set of strings of symbols con-
strained by specific rules. The global Internet routing
system can be represented as all active BGP routes, i.e. a
set of AS paths from all vantage points towards all ad-
vertised IP prefixes. By adopting the immediate analogy,
we define the Finite Route Language (FRL) as follows.
Definition. Let ΣAS be the set of all ASes, Π the set of
all IP addresses, p ⊂ Π an IP prefix, and p′ ⊂ p a more
specific prefix of p. Let further be (w, p) ∈ Σ∗AS × Π
a route with an AS path w ∈ Σ∗AS , i.e. an arbitrary
concatenation of ASes, to a prefix p ∈ Π, in the following
denoted r = wp. Then, we define L ⊂ Σ∗AS × Π as
the set of active routes to all advertised prefixes in the
global routing system, i.e. the set of all observable routes.
L(p) ⊂ L denotes the subset of routes to a given prefix
p ⊂ Π, such that
L(p) = {wuop ∈ L | w ∈ Σ∗AS ; u ∈ ΣAS ; o ∈ ΣAS}
with w being an AS subpath and u the upstream AS
of the origin AS o. For a given route r and a subprefix
p′ ⊂ p, we postulate r ∈ L(p)⇒ r ∈ L(p′) as a corollary,
since routes to less specific prefixes also cover more
specific prefixes. Note that the converse is false. Further,
LP ⊂ L denotes the set of all observable routes from
a set of observation points P ⊂ ΣAS . We reuse the
unary operator | . | to indicate the number of routes in
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a set O ⊆ L, the length of a route r ∈ L or a subpath
w ∈ Σ∗AS , and the number of ASes in a set S ⊆ ΣAS .
3.1 Formalization of Routing Attacks
BGP-based routing attacks are caused by injecting ille-
gitimate route updates that alter the global BGP routing
table in order to modify traffic flows. Route injections
are considered illegitimate, if they violate topological
constraints or policies as derived from business relations.
Attacker Model. Our attacker is assumed capable of
injecting arbitrary BGP messages into the global routing
system, i.e. he operates a BGP router and maintains
a BGP session to at least one upstream provider. The
attacker is not hindered by local filters or other validation
mechanisms of his upstream. Instead, the upstream
AS indifferently redistributes all update messages to
its peers, which thus may propagate throughout the
Internet. An observation point shall be in place to
monitor the propagation of BGP messages. It is worth
mentioning that route updates with less attractive paths
may not reach a particular observation point due to best
path selection in BGP. Without loss of generality, an
omnipresent observation point to observe the set of all
active routes L is assumed for the following definitions.
Generic Routing Attacks. We denote an attacker’s
AS a ∈ ΣAS and his victim’s AS v ∈ ΣAS . Further,
a victim’s prefix is given by pv ⊂ Π. Then, a generic
routing attack is defined by an attacker extending the
set of valid routes L by injecting forged routes Fa into
the routing system, such that the altered set of globally
active routes Lˆ(p′v) is given by
Lˆ(p′v) = L(pv) ∪ Fa(p′v) with p′v ⊆ pv .
In general terms, the attacker advertises reachability of
a victim’s network—either entirely or in parts—and may
thus attract a fraction of the victim’s inbound traffic.
Requirements and Impact. In BGP, the impact of
a hijacking attack generally depends on a best path
selection process. In particular, shorter AS paths are
preferred over longer ones, although policy-induced ex-
ceptions on a case-by-case basis may exist. With respect
to packet forwarding, routes to longer IP prefixes pre-
vail. Assuming the ambition to forge globally accepted
routes, an attacker thus succeeds if his routes towards a
victim’s network are considered best by a vast majority
of Internet participants. This implies that an attacker
needs to ensure that his bogus routes Fa(p′v) are either
1) shortest from a global perspective, i.e.
∀r ∈ L(p′v), ra ∈ Fa(p′v) : |ra| < |r|, or
2) more specific than all others, i.e.
∀p′′v ⊆ p′v ⊂ pv : L(p′′v) = L(p′v) = L(pv).
As a consequence, the prospects of identifying an attack
naturally depend on the significance of changes in Lˆ and
on the peculiarities of the forged routes.
3.2 Application to Interception Attacks
A BGP-based interception attack succeeds if data
packets sent to a victim are re-routed via an attacker’s
AS, who in turn needs to have a stable backhaul path to
the victim to forward the eavesdropped packets. Such
attacks are unfeasible to detect from a topological point
of view since only new paths over already existing links
emerge. In the following, we use our formalized route
model to thoroughly study these subtle changes.
Formal Model. The attacker a ∈ ΣAS chooses to ad-
vertise (a part of) the victim’s prefix pv ∈ Π, while
including a backhaul path in his announcemennts. As
a BGP speaker, the attacker can easily identify such a
path to pv in La(pv). The set of AS paths that represent
a suitable backhaul link via an arbitrary upstream AS
u ∈ ΣAS thus reads
W av (u) = {wav ∈ Σ∗AS | uwavpv ∈ La(pv)} .
Note that in practice, exactly one such path wav exists per
upstream AS, since each AS redistributes its prefered
routes only. For the attack to succeed, the attacker
needs to employ at least two upstream providers. In
the following, t ∈ ΣAS serves to establish the backhaul
link, while the remaining upstream providers S ⊂ ΣAS
are utilized to launch a particular (sub)prefix hijacking
attack [51] against p′v ⊆ pv such that
Lˆ(p′v) = {wvpv | w ∈ Σ∗AS } ∪ legitimate
{wsatwavp′v | w ∈ Σ∗AS ; forged
s ∈ S ; wav ∈W av (t)} .
Most notably, the attacker can hide his AS number
(see Section 2.1) while still forwarding between the up-
streams s and t. In any case, the attack does not lead to
suspicious topological changes. The observable sets of
both origin and upstream ASes for v remain unchanged,
while the forged route to p′v generates the impression of
originating from the victim’s AS v and propagating via
his legitimate upstream providers (as well as theirs).
4. THE CAIR FRAMEWORK
After introducing the concept of Constructible Au-
tomata for Internet Routes (CAIR), we formulate an
implementable search pattern for interception attacks.
4.1 Route Automata
We define a route automaton as a minimal determin-
istic finite-state automaton that accepts any given finite
route language (see Section 3). In general terms, an
automaton represents a state machine that accepts a
formal language, i.e. processing one of its words ends in
an accepting state. Let L ⊂ Σ∗AS × Π be an FRL rep-
resenting all routes in the global routing system. Then,
we define a route automaton as the 5-tuple
M = (Q, ΣAS ∪Π, δ, q0, F )
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Figure 3: Route automaton for an interception attack.
with Q a finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q the start state,
F ⊂ Q a set of accepting states, and δ a partial mapping
δ : Q× ΣAS ∪Π→ Q denoting transitions. We define
the extended transition function δ∗ for routes u~r ∈ L as
the mapping δ∗ : Q× L → Q such that
δ∗(q, ) = q
δ∗(q, u~r) =
{
δ∗(δ(q, u), ~r) if δ(q, u) 6= ⊥,
⊥ otherwise
with u ∈ Σ, ~r ∈ Σ∗ × Π a partial route, q ∈ Q,  an
empty path, and ⊥ a catching state with ⊥ /∈ Q that
represents nonexistent routes. We further define L(M)
as the language accepted by the automaton M as
L(M) = {r ∈ L | δ∗(q0, r) ∈ F} .
Then, MP denotes an automaton accepting a set of
observed routes LP ⊂ L from individual observation
points P ⊂ ΣAS such that L(MP ) = LP .
A path segment w ∈ Σ∗AS with r = w~r ∈ L, |w| < |r|
is denoted w ≺ r. We define the longest common path
segment wlp in M such that
∀r ∈ L(M), w ≺ r : |wlp| > |w|, δ∗(q0, wlp) 6= ⊥ .
The power set P(L) holds all finite languages that rep-
resent (partial) routes. We define the right language of
a state q ∈ Q in M as
~L(q) = {~r ∈ P(L) | δ∗(q, ~r) ∈ F} .
In other words, ~L : Q→ P(L) maps the state q to the
set of partial routes producible in the automaton M
starting at q. Note that the language accepted by M
can accordingly be defined by L(M) = ~L(q0).
All states q ∈ Q that accept the same right lan-
guage are equivalent and can be merged into a single
state. Iteratively applied, this process leads to a min-
imal automaton, in the following called route automa-
ton. This automaton is unique except isomorphisms
and requires a minimum number of states among all
automata that accept the same language [31]. Note
that the number of accepting states in a route automa-
ton is |F | = 1, since all routes r ∈ L end with an
IP prefix, i.e. ∀q ∈ Q, p ∈ Π : δ(q, p) ∈ F and
∀q ∈ Q, w ∈ Σ∗AS : δ∗(q, w) /∈ F . In the following, we
use qf to refer to this single accepting state.
4.2 A Search Pattern for Interception Attacks
We present a methodology to search route automata
for anomalies emerging from interception attacks. Before
we explain the details, we briefly illustrate the intuition
behind our approach (for background see Section 2.1).
4.2.1 Intuition behind the Detection Scheme
Figure 3 shows an interception attack on a (sub)prefix
p′v ⊆ pv ∈ Π of the victim v ∈ ΣAS , in which the at-
tacker a ∈ ΣAS fabricates an artificial path segment
wav = tuv ∈ Σ∗AS over t, u ∈ ΣAS as described in Sec-
tion 3.2. Recall our assumption that a distant AS t
that is not a direct upstream of v neutrally redistributes
the routes of v (Section 2.1). Hence, the right language
(Section 4.1) of the automaton state qt should represent
all transit routes over t (indicated by dashed lines in
Figure 3). In an interception scenario, however, the
attacker seemingly changes the routing policy of t: It
appears that t now forwards announcements of pv and
p′v differently, i.e. selectively to a, d ∈ ΣAS . As a result
of this diversity, our route automaton holds separate
states {qv, q′v}, {qu, q′u}, and {qt, q′t}.
In the remainder, we anticipate that the attacker
hides his true identity by not adding his AS number a to
the AS_PATH attribute of forged BGP messages (remove
dotted elements in Figure 3). In this case, we rename qs
to qa with s ∈ ΣAS being the attacker’s second upstream
provider. We further assume that the attacker seeks to
globally attract traffic to v by means of a strict subprefix
hijacking, i.e. p′v ⊂ pv ∈ Π, p′v 6= pv holds.
4.2.2 Translation to Route Automata
In order to detect interception attacks, we need to
search for a partial route that a) is used in a single
routing context only (artificiality), b) is in contradiction
to existing announcements (nonuniformity), and c) leads
to a subprefix of the benign routes (interception alert).
Within our route automata, these conditions can be
easily expressed and implemented.
Artificiality. An artificial path segment wav ∈ Σ∗AS is
given by a sequence of (at least) four states δ∗(qa, twav) =
q′v with a single outgoing transition each, i.e.
∀tw ∈ Σ∗AS , w 6= wav : δ∗(qa, tw) = ⊥ .
Nonuniformity. We further search for a path segment
wdv that is in contradiction with w
a
v such that
∃qd ∈ Q : δ∗(qd, wdv) = qv .
Interception alert. We verify if the offending state q′v
represents a subprefix hijacking of qv, i.e. if the condition
∃pv, p′v ∈ Π, p′v ⊂ pv : δ(qv, pv) = δ(q′v, p′v) = qf
holds true. We then raise an interception alert and
report pv, p
′
v, and w
a
v for further investigation.
4.2.3 Discrimination of the Attacker
With our route automaton, we are able to pinpoint
the attacker’s location in the Internet topology. If the at-
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tacker adds his AS number a to the BGP updates, we can
directly observe a transition labeled with a that points
to the offending state qa. Under the assumption that
the attacker is taking precautionary measures to hide
his AS (refer to Section 2.1), the incoming and outgoing
transitions of qa are labeled with s and t respectively. In
this case, we can isolate the attacker to be a customer of
both ISPs s and t, which leaves us with a small number
of possible ASes to be manually scrutinized.
5. INCIDENT DETECTIONWITH CAIR
We now deploy CAIR in practice and analyze seven
years of BGP data with respect to two applications of
CAIR, the detection of interception in BGP and route
leak analysis. First, we apply our detection scheme and
reveal 22 critical interception incidents so far unknown
with victims mostly belong to the R&D sector and to the
medium-sized ISP business. We explain details along two
case studies, including our ground truth DEFCON [46].
Second, we derive measures to study the importance of
ASes with respect to global routing, and evaluate their
characteristics over time. We compare our results to a
sudden and radical routing change during a recent route
leak of Telekom Malaysia (2015) [1].
5.1 BGP Interception Incidents
We use CAIR to construct route automata based on
BGP routing table entries from the RouteViews [43]
Oregon2 collector, August, 2008 – November, 2015, ana-
lyzed in an interval of two weeks (i.e. 174 RIBs with a
total of ≈2.4B entries).
5.1.1 Overview
In total, we identified 6,171 artificial path segments
wav ∈ Σ∗AS (see Section 3.2). For 527 of them, we found a
corresponding segment wdv ∈ Σ∗AS that evidenced nonuni-
form redistribution of BGP updates (Section 2.1). Our
detection scheme finally raised 41 alerts for (strict) sub-
prefix hijacking attacks. Table 1 presents the results.
Note that one of these events lasted for 8 weeks, i.e. ac-
counts for four subsequent alerts. Additional five events
were observed twice. This leaves us with a total number
of 32 distinct cases.
Sanitizing: Exclude false positives. Our search pat-
tern for interception is based on the observation that
nonuniform redistribution of BGP announcements should
only take place at a victim v itself or at his direct up-
stream ISPs, i.e. we search for artificial path segments
of length |wav | ≥ 3. This assumption breaks if the victim
operates multiple ASes [7] that are consecutively visible
in an AS path. We manually analyzed the 32 intercep-
tion alerts carefully, and were able to identify 9 sibling
cases, which we exclude from further investigation. The
remaining 23 alerts are marked as suspicious (Table 2).
August 10, 2008 – November 1, 2015 total in %
Artificial path segments wav 6,171 100.0%
Nonuniform redistribution wzv 6= wav 527 8.54%
Interception alerts1 p′v ⊂ pv 41 0.66%
Unique alerts (victims) 32 0.52%
Manual inspection
Sibling ASes (victim) -7 0.11%
Sibling ASes (upstream) -2 0.03%
Alerts after manual inspection 23 0.37%
Table 1: Interception alerts raised by CAIR.
1Concerning subprefix announcements only.
Substantial alerts. We summarize the 23 alerts in Ta-
ble 2. Entries that are highlighted in grey represent the
upstream AS s ∈ ΣAS that is used by an attacker to
redistribute forged BGP updates. The corresponding
AS neighbor t ∈ ΣAS represents the attacker’s second
upstream, which is used to uphold the backhaul path.
The underlined parts of the AS paths show the artificial
segment wav . In 13 cases, w
a
v is of length 3 (plus the
attacker’s two upstreams and possibly further intermedi-
ate ASes), while 6 cases exhibit a segment length of 4 AS
hops. The 4 remaining incidents show longer segments.
To better grasp the details of the incidents, we checked
AS names in the WHOIS system. Note that some of
these events date far back to the past. We consequently
utilized archived WHOIS data for the respective dates.
5.1.2 Case Studies
Ground Truth: The DEFCON Attack (2008).
The DEFCON attack [46] was a well-known experiment
to demonstrate interception attacks in the Internet. All
details on the attack are publicly available [11] and thus
provide perfect ground truth for validating CAIR.
Figure 4 shows the resulting route automaton that
corresponds to the alert raised by CAIR. The victim
AS20195 (Sparkplug) initially advertises four distinct pre-
fixes including 24.120.56.0/22. During the attack, two
more specific prefixes (24.120.56.0/24 and 24.120.58.0/24)
appear to originate from this AS. With our automaton,
we can identify the highlighted artificial path segments.
Note that none of the corresponding states shows any
other outgoing transitions in contrast to the valid seg-
ment. We can locate the attacker at qa: it is either
AS26627, or a common customer of this AS and AS4436
(see Subsection 4.2.3). Our observations fully comply
with the public, verified information about that DEF-
CON incident [11]. The attacker was located at AS4436.
The Tehran Incident (2013). Another interception
alert of particular interest that was reported by CAIR
affects AS25306 (INSTITUTE-ISIRAN IsIran). We refer
to this event as the Tehran Incident. Compared to the
6
Date Forged AS path / nonuniform route segment Victim / country / company
1,22008/08/10 AS26627
::::::
AS4436 AS22822 AS23005 AS20195 United States, Sparkplug Las Vegas
2009/02/01 AS3303
::::::
AS1299 AS701 AS3491 AS37004 AS30988 Nigeria, IS InternetSolutions
2009/10/15 AS3561
::::::
AS7018 AS4837 AS4808 AS17431 AS17964 China, Beijing Network Technologies
2010/05/15 AS2914
::::::
AS3549 AS3356 AS23148 AS20080 AS1916 Brasil, Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa
2010/12/15 AS34984
::::::
AS12301 AS3549 AS9121 AS12794 Turkey, Akbank
2011/01/15 AS9002
::::::
AS21230 ..(+2).. AS3356 AS9121 AS44565 Turkey, Vital Teknoloji
2011/03/01 AS4134
::::::
AS40633 ..(+4).. AS6453 AS9299 AS18223 India, Capital IQ Information Systems
2011/04/01 AS3549
::::::
AS5391 AS25144 AS42432 AS8670 Bosnia, University of Sarajevo
2011/04/01 AS3549
::::::
AS10026 AS9957 AS10036 AS18334 South Korea, Gyounggidongbu Cable TV
2011/08/15 AS1273
::::::
AS1299 AS3491 AS20485 AS8402 Russia, Vimpelcom
2011/12/01 AS6762
::::::
AS31133 AS12695 AS34123 AS28738 Russia, InterLAN Communications
2011/12/15 AS702
:::::
AS701 AS3549 AS21371 AS49669 United Kingdom, Cognito
2012/09/15 AS2828
::::::
AS1299 AS9498 AS58459 AS4613 Nepal, Mercantile Office Systems
2012/11/01 AS30496
::::::
AS11427 AS7843 AS6461 AS33481 AS40610 United States, Digital Passage
2012/12/15 AS30496
::::::
AS11427 AS7843 AS6461 AS33481 AS21854 United States, Digital Passage
2013/02/15 AS1273
::::::
AS2914 AS8928 AS5391 AS57888 Croatia, Telesat
2013/06/01 AS1299
::::::
AS6663 ..(+3).. AS6939 AS197043 AS197890 Germany, Megaservers
2013/07/15 AS3356
::::::
AS1299 AS6663 AS41571 AS48828 Romania, Carosystem
22013/08/15 AS3549
::::::
AS3491 AS12880 AS43343 AS21341 AS25306 Iran, Institute IsIran
2013/12/01 AS1299
::::::
AS9498 AS12880 AS41881 AS51411 Iran, Toos-Ashena
2015/02/15 AS1299
::::::
AS52320 AS16735 AS28284 AS262353 Brasil, Marcelo Bonini
2015/07/15 AS3356
:::::
AS209 ..(+2).. AS721 AS27066 AS747 United States, US Army ISC
2015/08/15 AS46450
::::::
AS1299 AS3356 AS6079 AS55079 United States, Third Gear Networks
s: ASN t:
:::
ASN wav : ASN ... ASN
Table 2: Remaining interception alerts after manual inspection.
1Public demonstration of an interception attack at DEFCON [46].
2Studied more closely in Subsection 5.1.2.
DEFCON attack, the analysis of this incident is more
challenging for two reasons. First, this incident has not
been discussed in the public so far. Second, the attack
took place in 2013, which makes verification based on
additional data sets difficult.
Figure 5 shows the corresponding details. On August
15, 2013, AS25306 advertised eight prefixes including
81.28.23.0/19. At the same time, we observe an ar-
tificial path wav ∈ Σ∗AS of length 5 to the subprefix
81.28.37.0/24. Within our route automaton we are
able to localize the attacker at the state qa. Our tech-
nique yields that he must be a common customer of
both AS3549 (Level3 ) and AS3491 (Beyond the Network
America (BTNA)).
To substantiate our observation, we searched operator
mailing lists and online discussion platforms for further
evidence. The incident itself was not reported. How-
ever, we may speculate about potential customers of the
ISPs involved, who maybe benefit from an interception.
Level 3 is a tier 1 ISP with a quite diverse set of cus-
tomers. BTNA seems to have a particular reputation
as a spammer-friendly service provider. Note that spam
activities also misuse BGP [49] to prevent backtracking.
Although interception itself has not been documented
so far in the context of spamming, an operator of a
spamming network could be interested to implement
this attack: Any mitigation mechanism at the receiver
side that requires the correct end point (e.g., callback
verification) can be fouled using the backhaul path. Fur-
thermore, we found an abuse report [28], where BTNA
apparently served as upstream for a hijacking attack
during an other event.
To conclude, we do not have a proof that the Tehran
Incident was indeed an interception attack. However,
based on manual investigation we found strong evidence
that the alarm triggered by CAIR was correct.
5.2 Analysis of Route Leaks
To further demonstrate the expressiveness of CAIR,
we derive a simple yet effective metric to assess route
leaks. In its most basic form, a route leak is given by
a multi-homed AS, in the following called the origi-
nator, who (accidentially) re-advertises its full routing
table into BGP. Upstream ISPs often prefer customer
routes [26] and thus redistribute the corresponding BGP
announcements. The result is a major shift in global
Internet traffic such that packet flows are now redirected
towards the originator. Although a route leak leads to
significant activity in BGP, it leaves individual AS links
intact. As a consequence, network graphs are ill-suited
for the detection and analysis of such events.
A measure for routing dominance. In order to asses
the routing changes imposed by route leaks, we intro-
duce a metric for routing dominance. Recall that each
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Figure 4: Route automaton for the DEFCON Attack (AS20195). August 10, 2008.
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Figure 5: Route automaton for the Tehran Incident (AS25306). August 15, 2013.
state q ∈ Q in our minimized automaton represents an
equivalence class, i.e. a set of partial routes ~L(q) ac-
cepted by q (see Section 4). We extend this abstract
concept to ASes u ∈ ΣAS such that ~Q(u) yields the set
of all states that are reachable via transitions labeled
with u as given by
~Q(u) = {q ∈ Q | δ∗(~q, uw) = q, ~q ∈ Q\{qf}, w ∈ Σ∗AS}.
The size of | ~Q(u)| implicitly represents the number of
(partial) routes over AS u. The larger this set is for a
given AS, the more of its advertised routes are redis-
tributed by its peers, i.e. the more it dominates routing
in BGP. Contrary to intuition, this metric does not yield
a particular high rank for the peers of our BGP collec-
tor. They exhibit an average rank of 3,808. The top-5
ASes ranked by | ~Q| are AS2914 (NTT ), AS3356 (Level3 ),
AS3257 (Tinet), AS1299 (Telia), and AS174 (Cogent),
which all are prominent tier-1 providers.
Regular route updates and route leaks. We evalu-
ate regular changes in | ~Q| for individual ASes over seven
years based on our RouteViews data set and compare the
results to a recent route leak caused by AS4788 (Telekom
Malaysia) on June 12, 2015 between 08:00 and 10:00.
On average, we observe 9,019 ASes that experience any
change in | ~Q| during the periods of two weeks. Note
that the average number of ASes that newly appear
in BGP—and thus regularly change | ~Q| for their up-
stream ISPs—is 364, i.e. significantly lower. Taking into
account this growth in BGP participants, we obtain a
corresponding average of 19.61% of ASes with changes in
| ~Q|. For the Malaysia route leak, we observed a change
in routing dominance for 7,498 ASes (14.67%) in an
interval of less than two hours.
We further observe an average of 76,785 states that
ongoing route leak
Top-10 ASes 06:00 (T1) 08:00 (T2) – 10:00 (T3) 12:00 (T4)
u ∈ ΣAS | ~QT1 (u)| | ~QT3 (u)| − | ~QT2 (u)| | ~QT4 (u)|
1. AS577 75,811 -74,735 (-98.57% ) 75,660
2. AS4788 1,555 +32,621 (+2,239%) 1,412
3. AS1267 32,514 -32,218 (-99.11% ) 32,541
4. AS174 94,702 -16,770 (-17.73% ) 93,905
5. AS3549 16,455 +11,523 (+71.1%) 13,359
6. AS3356 101,547 -4,522 (-4.45% ) 101,262
7. AS6453 72,213 -3,965 (-5.48% ) 71,918
8. AS6695 713 +3,782 (+531%) 719
9. AS2914 107,226 -3,733 (-3.48% ) 106,862
10. AS1299 117,673 -3,416 (-2.90% ) 117,387
Most affected: AS577 Bell, AS1267 Wind, AS174 Cogent
Propagators: AS4788 Tel. Malaysia, AS3549 Level3, AS6695 DE-CIX
Table 3: ASes by amount of newly (un-)reachable states.
Malaysia Route Leak, June 12, 2015.
are added to or removed from the set ~Q(u) of any AS
u ∈ ΣAS . In contrast to that, the Malaysia route leak led
to a total change in reachability of 248,760 states. Such
a significant and abrupt re-routing is unprecedented
during normal operations. The largest (regular) individ-
ual increase of 54,402 newly reachable states attributes
to AS3257 (Tinet). For AS2914 (NTT ), we find the
largest decrease of 39,442 states. During the route leak,
in contrast, we can observe that a single AS, namely
AS577 (Bell Canada) loses reachability of 74,735 states
(-98.57%) within the duration of the event. At the same
time, the size of | ~Q| for Telekom Malaysia increased by
32,621 entries (+2,239%). Such a sudden significant in-
crease in global routing dominance is unlikely the result
of a regular change in peering agreements.
The Malaysia Route Leak (2015). The incident
started on June 12, 2015, at 08:40, and began to grad-
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ually settle down about two hours later. We split the
event in four intervals. For T2–T3 (08:00–10:00), we eval-
uate the top-10 ASes that exhibit the highest absolute
change in reachable states | ~Q|. We compare our results
to the as-is state before and after the event, i.e. at T1
(06:00) and T4 (12:00). Note that the overall size of the
automata hardly changed during the time frame of the
route leak (-3.96% of states and -10.47% of transitions).
Table 3 shows further results.
We already observed a remarkably high shift in glob-
ally dominating routes that lies well above the aver-
age during normal operations. We see a vast increase
in reachable states | ~Q|—which notably correlates to
inbound traffic—for the originator AS4788 and corre-
spondingly for his upstream ISPs AS3549 (Level3 ) and
AS6695 (DE-CIX ). Note that the latter does not provide
upstream connectivity under normal circumstances. Its
high increase in dominant routes is rather an artifact:
Telekom Malaysia peers with the public route servers at
DE-CIX, which redistribute routes from 456 connected
ASes to a total of 14,542 different ASes. Apparently,
AS4788 leaked these routes such that the AS path of
corresponding BGP updates comprised AS6695. This is
surprising since route servers at DE-CIX Internet Ex-
change Point operate transparently and effectively hide
their own AS (see Section 2.1).
The largest decrease in | ~Q|—both in relative and abso-
lute terms—attributes to AS577. A similar observation
can be made for AS1267 (Wind Telecomunicazioni) and
also to some extent for AS174 (Cogent). Since the origi-
nator’s routes are globally prefered during the incident,
these ASes consequently lose a major part of their in-
bound traffic in exchange for an increase in outbound
traffic towards AS4788. Note that only a smaller number
of all ASes (14.67%) propagate routes towards AS47888;
the greater part (85.33%) is affected outbound, i.e. only
receives corresponding routes. Within two hours after
the event, routing converged back to its original state
(see right column in Table 3).
Towards a reliable detection scheme. With CAIR,
we are able to precisely identify the role of each party
involved in a route leak. We already showed that only
a moderate number of ASes is directly affected by re-
routing, which in turn can be classified into groups
that either gain or lose in reachable states | ~Q|. The
highest absolute increase in reachable states attributes
to the originator of a leak, followed by his upstream
ISPs. Hence, we are able to identify catalyst upstreams,
which unwittingly propagate the leak. Note that the
measure | ~Q| directly correlates to the amount of traffic
attracted by an AS. As a consequene, we can further
assess the impact of a route leak on individual ISPs.
Based on these observations, we can easily derive
a threshold to detect emerging route leaks. We will
analyze more incidents in our future work.
6. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF CAIR
For large volumes of input data such as a global set
of routes in BGP, the construction of route automata is
challenging. In the following, we describe our approach
to minimization in CAIR in detail. and thoroughly quan-
tify the performance of CAIR. We show that the required
resources for the route automaton are competitive with
graphs and can even decrease with more routes being
added as an effect of minimization. We further study the
correlation between automata size and Internet growth.
6.1 Implementation
The most basic algorithms to implement DFA mini-
mization have a complexity of up to O(|ΣAS ∪Π| · |Q|2)
(for notations see Section 4). Although more efficient
algorithms exist [57], the size of our intended input data
greatly exceeds that of common use cases in language
processing, both in terms of the number of words (i.e. ob-
servable routes) and the size of the alphabet (i.e. nodes
in the network). For comparison, the English alphabet
consists of 26 letters, whereas the technical size of a
routing alphabet is |ΣAS |+ |Π| = 232 + 232 for the IPv4
address space of the Internet.
6.1.1 Minimization of Automata
To construct an MDFA efficiently, we adopt a special-
purpose algorithm [15] that minimizes a DFA during con-
struction without ever holding the full non-minimized au-
tomaton in memory. Its memory complexity is O(|Qm|),
where |Qm| is the number of states in the minimized
automaton. The algorithm is capable to randomly add
or remove routes, whereas common minimization algo-
rithms need to re-minimize at each change of data.
Note that this particular approach expects an acyclic
transition function δ∗ such that
∀r ∈ L(M) : @ q ∈ Q : δ∗(q, r) = q .
Hence, corresponding automata do not support lan-
guages where symbols or substrings repeatedly occur
within a given string. In the next section, we show that
this is not a limitation in our context.
6.1.2 Incremental Construction Algorithm
The procedure to add a route to a given (possibly
empty) route automaton is inspired by [15] and comprises
three major steps. First, for each route the automaton
is traversed along the longest common path segment,
thereby ensuring that no invalid paths are introduced.
Second, states that accept the remaining part of the
route are newly created. The final step is to carry out an
on-the-fly minimization while traversing the automaton
in backward direction. In the following, we present an
in-depth description of the individual steps. Note that
during construction, we utilize a register of states QR,
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which is implemented as a hash table. Its keys represent
unique right languages ~L(q) for individual states q ∈ Q.
This provides an efficient way to search for equivalent
states, i.e. for states with identical right languages.
Step 1 Common Path Traversal . To add a new
route r ∈ L to M , we start at q0 and traverse the
automaton along a (possibly empty) sequence of existing
states for the longest common path segment wlp in M .
For so-called confluence states that have more than one
incoming transition, we need to create a new state with
identical outgoing transitions and link it to the last state
traversed. This cloning process prevents inadvertently
adding false paths. Note that this is inherently the case
with network graphs.
Step 2 Remaining Route Insertion . After finding
a specific state q that represents the longest common
path segment wlp, it is removed from the state register
QR since its right language is about to change. If the
whole route is accepted in the first step, i.e. if |wlp| = |r|,
it is already contained in the automaton. Otherwise,
we add new states for the remaining part of the route
and link them with corresponding transitions. The last
created state is marked as an accepting state.
Step 3 On-the-fly Minimization . Finally, we tra-
verse the automaton in backward direction along the
sequence of states that represent the newly inserted
route r. For each state q, we search our register QR for
an equivalent state q˜ that already exists in M . If found,
we discard q and link its preceding state to q˜. Otherwise,
q is unique across all states of M and needs to be added
to the register QR.
Note that by traversing the automaton backwards in
step 3, the comparison of right languages to identify
existing equivalent states is reduced to a comparison
of transitions, since recursive application would only
yield the results of already compared states. Hence, it
is sufficient for keys in QR to represent the transitions
of individual states instead of their full right language,
which greatly reduces computational complexity.
Interestingly, by leaving out step 3, we obtain trie data
structures (see Section 2.2). Beside redirection of transi-
tions, this step only removes states from memory. As a
consequence, route automata strictly outperform tries
with respect to memory requirements and expressiveness
due to the absence of redundancy.
To summarize, our construction algorithm allows to
randomly add or remove routes while still ensuring min-
imality. CAIR is thus particularly well-suited for contin-
uous monitoring of routing changes in BGP. We can also
create and archive individual automata that represent
the global routing system at specific points in time. We
made use of this feature in our evaluation.
Solving Loops. Our finite route language, and thus
CAIR, account for the construction of any set of network
routes consisting of nodes and links [44] as long as the
August 10, 2008 November 1, 2015
RIB entries |Lore| 10,686,819 22,303,775
IP prefixes |Π| 276,706 600,216
AS numbers |ΣAS | 29,203 52,396
Unique AS paths1 |{w |wp∈L}| 1,421,062 2,875,026
CAIR states |Qore| 168,184 302,598
CAIR transitions |δore| 4,939,314 10,355,671
Graph nodes |Nore| 305,909 652,612
Graph links |Lore| 339,515 725,425
Table 4: Objects created after importing RIB data.
1Unprepended AS paths only.
input is cycle-free. Even though most routing protocols
such as BGP provide built-in support for loop prevention,
loops may be included in routing data. Network opera-
tors, for example, may decide to influence route selection
by adding their own AS number multiple times to the AS
path (AS path prepending). Still, this is not a problem
for our approach: A simple way to model subsequent
occurrences of a particular AS o in M is to extend ΣAS
by multiple instances oi ∈ ΣAS with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . }.
6.2 Performance Properties of CAIR
To study the performance of CAIR in more detail,
we construct a route automaton using the BGP routing
table export from the RouteViews [43] collector Oregon2
on November 1, 2015.
States and Transitions. The RouteViews collector
peers with 41 ASes that represent our set of observation
points Pore ⊂ Σ∗AS . These peers advertise 600,216 IP
prefixes p ∈ Π via 2,875,026 distinct AS paths w ∈ Σ∗AS
that comprise 52,396 individual ASes o ∈ ΣAS . The
full set of routes known to the collector is thus given
by Lore ⊂ {wp | w ∈ Σ∗AS , p ∈ Π} and consists of
|Lore| = 22, 303, 775 routes. The corresponding route au-
tomaton More accepts the finite route language Lore. It
utilizes |Qore| = 302, 598 states and |δore| = 10, 355, 671
transitions to hold the entire RIB export (Table 4). It
is worth mentioning that CAIR clearly outperforms a
trie [4] holding the same information, which would re-
quire 73.71 times as many nodes and 2.15 times the
amount of transitions.
Our vanilla implementation in Python needs 18.4 min-
utes to parse the input data and 99.4 minutes to create
the automaton; subsequent updates can be applied in
real-time. An optimized C++ version for operational
deployment is ongoing work.
Comparison to network graphs. We define a net-
work graph G = (N,L) as a set of nodes N = ΣAS ∪Π
and a set of links L ⊂ ΣAS×ΣAS∪Π, which yields a total
number of |N | = 652, 612 nodes and |L| = 725, 425 links
for the collector studied above. In comparison, CAIR
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Figure 6: Performance characteristics of CAIR in comparison to network graphs.
requires only 46.37% of states but 14.28 times more
transitions to represent the full routing table. Taking
into account that CAIR also holds all observed routes on
top of individual AS links as represented by the graph,
its efficiency is remarkably competitive.
Figure 6a quantifies the evolvement of states and tran-
sitions in CAIR and the network graph while consecu-
tively importing new routes. CAIR requires fewer states
but needs more transitions to implement its expressive-
ness. The minimization approach in CAIR, however,
introduces self-adaptive optimization. To clarify this,
Figure 6b shows the number of states (transitions) rel-
atively to their maximum number during construction.
While the graph data structure created ≈90% of the re-
quired objects already after importing 10% of all routes
in the input data set, CAIR grows slower. This nicely
illustrates that the graph, in contrast to CAIR, does
not learn additional information with additional routes
observed. More importantly, the amounts of states de-
creases in CAIR significantly after adding 55% of the
routes. This implies that adding further routes to the
automaton can actually reduce its size, which is due to
the minimization process getting more effective on larger
volumes of input data. This finding is of particular in-
terest with respect to possible applications of CAIR in
real-time routing analysis.
Resource requirements depending on Internet
growth. We now study retroactively the routing system
at particular points in time. We use the RouteViews
data as described above to construct different route au-
tomata in an interval of two weeks over the period of
August, 2008 till November, 2015. Table 4 presents the
absolute number of required resources. Figure 6c shows
the relative evolution of the RIB information content
compared to resource requirements in CAIR and the
corresponding graph data structure. It is clearly visible
that the graph depends mainly on the number of IP
prefixes, whereas CAIR depends on the number of RIB
entries as those provide additional routing insights.
7. DISCUSSION
Is CAIR limited to subprefix hijacking, which
could even be protected against by RPKI? No.
Even if an attacker intercepts an already announced
prefix, CAIR would detect this incident. The intercep-
tion leads to a different routing policy, i.e. the attacked
prefix is announced differently compared to all other
prefixes of the origin AS. Protection of the full AS path
requires BGPsec, which will not be deployed in the near
future [24], stressing the need for protective monitoring.
Can CAIR detect incidents in which all prefixes
of an origin AS are simultaneously intercepted?
Not now. The current search pattern is based on route
diversity per AS. If all prefixes of an AS are compre-
hensively intercepted as announced by the victim, we
would de facto observe a uniform redistribution. How-
ever, CAIR stores all routing paths and allows for easy
integration of additional search patterns.
Does CAIR depend on the selection of a specific
set of observation points? No. If an intercepted
subprefix hijacking occurs, the update will be visible in
the default-free zone, similar to the victim’s less specific
prefixes. However, our chances to detect the hijacking of
prefixes depend on the observation of competing routes.
For this reason, we suggest to utilize a well-connected
BGP collector such as the one we used in our evaluation.
Does CAIR require training of the data set? No.
CAIR transforms routing data (either measured or artifi-
cially constructed) into a route automaton. Reasoning is
defined by search patterns, which are based on common
operational practice.
Is the concept of FRLs self-contained? Yes.
The definition of finite route languages is consistent in
itself and solely based on formal languages. We assume,
though, that a partial algebra [40] defined over such
an FRL could be embedded into Sobrinho’s routing
algebra [53]. Given the existence of such a link, we
would be able to approach the theory of policy-based
routing [10] from an experimental point of view.
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8. RELATEDWORK
Graph-based models. Internet graphs oversimplify
reality [8, 29, 32, 50, 58], in particular AS-level graphs as
ASes are neither atomic [45] nor is there a clear notion
of an edge between two AS nodes [58]. CAIR is in
line with these observations as our framework does not
consider an AS as a single node but in the context of its
abutting paths. This provides the flexibility to model
complex policy-based routing decisions. To improve
modeling, sophisticated concepts, like multigraphs and
hypergraphs [50], as well as annotated edges have been
proposed. With finite route languages and corresponding
route automata, CAIR provides a natural approach to
formalize and evaluate the global routing system.
Routing Policies. The Gao Rexford model [21] is a
good approximation for most AS relationships but does
not hold in general [22]. Inter-AS routing is more com-
plex [16], e.g. by partial transit [23], which directly
affects routing export policies. Prefix diversity as imple-
mented by origin ASes has been analyzed recently by
Anwar et al. [2]. CAIR naturally reflects these prefix-
specific policies. More importantly, such observations
are consistent with our assumption that an origin AS
may advertise its prefixes differently, and that an arbi-
trary AS will usually not distinguish between prefixes
of the same origin AS. We addressed exceptions in Sec-
tion 5.1. A theoretical approach for policy-based routing
has been introduced with Sobrinho’s routing algebra [53].
Subsequent work focused mainly on abstract models of
routing policies [54,55] and their unification [10,27].
Generic Hijacking Detection. A common way to
detect and assess hijacking is based on the analysis of
(i) control-plane information [6, 19,20,39,41,42,59], (ii)
data-plane measurements [13,14,36,38,48,60], or (iii) the
combination of both [5, 33, 35,37,52,56]. CAIR belongs
to the first class. We want to emphasize that CAIR is
not solely a system for anomaly and hijacking detection,
but a rigorous framework to model and assess various
aspects of routing. Bogon route leaks have been studied
in the past [18]. Hira et al. [30] argued that the China
Telecom incident was most likely a route leak because
of missing subprefix hijacking. We complement these
findings with a study of the Telekom Malaysia incident.
Interception Attacks. The impact of interception at-
tacks was studied in detail using a next-hop signature
and simulations [3]. No decisive evidence for the disc-
coverd events could be found. In contrast to this, we
verified CAIR using ground truth data, and confirmed
new incidents using complementary data sources.
Current approaches [47] that use control-plane data
to detect interceptions are challenged by the lack of a
complete AS-level topology [9, 25]. Careful tuning of
heuristic parameters is necessary to yield stable detection
results. CAIR, instead, is well-suited to operate on
incomplete data as it explores routing properties therein.
Real-time detection was analyzed by leveraging a
light-weight, distributed active measurement scheme [61].
CAIR can be deployed for real-time analysis as well, but
does not depend on active probing and thus is a non-
invasive technique. A practical demonstration of the
applicability of interception attacks was presented in [46].
Complementary results from an operational point of view
are provided in [11]. We evaluate CAIR using this data
in our ground truth case study.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce CAIR, a novel formaliza-
tion of Internet routing to address a fundamental prob-
lem with network graphs. Our model is designed to pre-
serve route diversity, where routes from AS1 → AS2 and
AS2 → AS3 in general do not imply a route AS1 → AS3.
It is based on formal language theory. With so-called fi-
nite route languages, we provide a comprehensive formal
framework in which routing aspects can be rigorously de-
scribed. To put this theoretic concept into practical use,
we propose CAIR as an implementable equivalent that
is based on the construction of minimal deterministic
automata. Corresponding route automata offer unique
benefits in terms of efficiency and expressivenes. In par-
ticular, CAIR preserves route diversity and solves the
transitivity problem of graphs. We will make our fully
functional reference implementation available. CAIR
can readily be used to study policy-based routing.
We applied our routing model to formalize a sophis-
ticated man-in-the-middle attack in BGP, which can
be translated into a practical search pattern that is im-
plementable in our route automata. With an analysis
of BGP routing tables of more than seven years, we
demonstrated great potential in using CAIR for routing
analysis. We gained insight into normal and abnormal
routing changes, studied a known route leak incident in
thorough detail, and identified 22 new cases of intercep-
tion attacks. We showed that the applicability of CAIR
reaches well beyond the detection of routing anomalies.
Future Work. We intend to advance our approach in
several directions. The detection of interception attacks,
and hijacking in general, can still be improved, and more
incidents ought to be studied in detail. We further see a
need to deploy CAIR on a continuous basis and to moni-
tor the global routing table for route leaks and attacks in
real-time. An optimized version of our implementation
to handle live BGP streams is in development. We plan
to investigate other research areas that utilize AS-level
graphs and thus can naturally benefit from CAIR. In
principle, our framework can be applied to any policy-
based routing scenario. An evaluation of corresponding
analysis techniques is part of our future work. We fur-
ther intend to study the link between our formal model
and algebraic approaches to routing analysis.
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